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Introduction
Before consumer goods reach …nal consumer markets, they typically undergo an extended transformation process based on the use of numerous inputs. The quality of consumer goods, thus, relies on the quality of all inputs that are used within the value chain. Besides faulty inputs inappropriate handling at each transformation stage can also cause severe product failures. Firms that can not e¤ectively control for their suppliers'quality run the risk of litigation 1 and damage to their brand names and reputations. Moreover, various recent events show that the costs for late failure elimination can be substantial: DaimlerChrysler recalled about 1.3 million cars in order to check the battery control unit software for the electrical and braking systems as well as the voltage regulator in the alternator in 2005. 2 Two years later, Mattel recalled about 18 million toys that were produced in China because of small dislodgeable magnets as well as toxic lead paint. More recently, the Chinese Melamine-scandale forced manufacturers such as Arla, Nestle and Cadbury to recall their products in a worldwide action. 3 Quality agreements between the trading partners along the chain help to mitigate potential risks by complementing more basic public standards. Inter alia, they clarify quality speci…cations and how they are met and de…ne each trading partners'responsibilities. Though quality agreements are made in all manufacturing industries, they are particularly common in the food sector. The so called private quality standards can be either developed on a business-to-business (e.g. Global GAP, SQF100) or a business-to-consumer basis (e.g. Tesco's Nature's Choice, Carrefour's Filière Qualité), whereas business-to consumer standards play an increasingly important role. 4 Against this background, we examine how delivery tari¤s and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. That is, the buyer 1 Several product safety regulations like the Consumer Product Safety Act in the U.S. or the European Directive on General Product Safety (2001/95/EC) have imposed the duty on manufacturers and retailers to sell only products that are safe. Furthermore, there are also speci…c requirements that apply to speci…c types of products (e.g. food, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices). 2 http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0"1543346,00.html 3 http://www.food-business-review.com/article_news.asp?guid=BFA77A40-A4E9-4674-AA62-3A65EAE69EDD 4 Tesco's Nature Choice-the quality program of the UK's largest retailer-was implemented in 1992 in order to ensure that fruits and vegetables are grown to high safety, quality and environmental standards. Likewise, Carrefour, Europe's largest retailer, has developed a quality supply chain label guaranteeing that products meet a speci…ed level of quality at each production stage. Meanwhile, this program has been applied to about 250 supply chains, covering more than 35,000 producers. 2 can neither observe the actual quality of the supplier's product nor can she monitor the supplier's production process itself. In order to capture the implied incentive problems in a long-term buyerseller relationship, we consider an in…nitely repeated game. At the beginning of each period, an upstream seller negotiates with a downstream buyer about a delivery contract that comprises delivery tari¤s as well as quality requirements. The latter may refer to a quality agreement, which can be determined either jointly by both …rms or unilaterally by the downstream …rm.
The product quality realizes anew in each period. Its value depends on various external factors like the workers'mood, weather conditions or the infestation by pests in agricultural production.
Thus, the actual quality is supposed to be random in each period.
By spending e¤ort, the upstream …rm reduces the danger of product damage. The more the upstream …rm invests in smart and careful monitoring systems, the higher the probability of meeting the quality requirements speci…ed in the delivery contract. In other words, despite the implementation of a monitoring system, the production process at the manufacturers'level can run into failures. We assume that the actual quality can only be observed by the upstream …rm. The downstream …rm, however, neither observes the upstream …rm's e¤ort in monitoring systems nor can she verify the actual quality of the product. This is due to the fact, that it may be prohibitively expensive to fully control the complete batch even though new developed testing technologies will provide better information at lower cost and in a shorter time.
Given this framework of hidden action and hidden information, we analyze incentive compatible delivery contracts which guarantee that the upstream …rm truthfully reveals the quality of her product and that …rms continue their business relationship. We show that both the delivery tari¤s and the quality negotiated between the …rms are e¢ cient if and only if the …rms' outside options, i.e. the pro…ts they could earn with alternative trading partners, are su¢ ciently low. Hence, the e¢ ciency of delivery tari¤s and quality decisions is only ensured if the mutual dependency between the vertically related …rms is high enough. The higher the …rms'outside options, the more delivery tari¤s and the target quality have to be distorted in order to satisfy the upstream …rm's incentive constraints. While wholesale prices are monotonically increasing in the …rms'outside options, the negotiated quality is a u-shaped function of the …rms'outside options. Key for these results is that the upstream …rm's incentive constraint prevents e¢ cient risk sharing between the …rms. To reduce the implied e¢ ciency losses and to increase the up-stream …rm's investment incentives, wholesale prices have to be distorted upwards. The higher the wholesale price the upstream …rm gets if she complies with the quality requirements, the more the upstream …rm will invest. Furthermore, the lower the quality requirements the more likely the upstream …rm can meet the requirements by increasing her investment. Hence, as long as wholesale prices are only little distorted, the quality requirements are ine¢ ciently low.
However, highly distorted wholesale prices may well induce the …rms to increase the quality requirements as the upstream …rm's investment incentives are increasing in the wholesale price.
Correspondingly, high investment incentives implied by high wholesale prices allow the …rms to increase the quality requirements without reducing the probability of meeting these requirements too much. Additionally, the higher the quality the higher are the downstream …rm's expected revenues. Hence, relatively high outside options can lead to upward distortions of both the wholesale prices and the negotiated qualities.
These results contribute to the large literature on contracting with imperfect information.
Our assumption that the upstream …rm's investment are not observable corresponds to the classical principal agent models with moral hazard (see for example Holmstrom 1979 and the comprehensive analysis in Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) . Whereas most of these models assume that outputs are observable and focus on optimal contracts with risk averse agents, our model builds on risk-neutral agents and repeated interactions. Furthermore, we assume that the downstream …rm can not observe the actual quality of the upstream …rm's product. Delivery contracts have therefore to be based on the upstream …rm's announcement about the realized quality of the good. The implied incentive constraint for truthful revelation rests on repeated interactions and di¤ers from the incentive constraints analyzed in hidden information models with heterogenous agents (see for example Baron and Myerson 1982) . Considering the dynamic structure of our model, we assume that periods are independent and focus on stationary contracts (see Fudenberg et al. 1990 ). Our model thus combines the classical moral hazard problem with deviation incentives analyzed in the literature on reputation and collusion (see for example Milgrom and Roberts 1982 , Schmidt 1993 , and Feuerstein 2005 ).
Furthermore, our paper contributes to the literature on quality standards and buyer power.
Quality standards have received growing attention in politics as well as in economics. So far, however, most of the economic literature refers to public minimum quality standards. 5 Only a small strand of literature focuses on private standards. Analyzing product di¤erentiation and ignoring asymmetric information as well as quality uncertainties, Giraud-Héraud et al. (2003) show that the retailer's incentive to di¤erentiate their businesses via private labels are the higher the lower the public minimum standard. Taking asymmetric information into account, potential e¢ ciency gains of private standards are discussed in OECD (2006) . While private standards can improve the e¢ ciency of the food system, they may also establish entry barriers and may thus lead to exclusionary e¤ects. 6 The wide literature on buyer power analyzes the sources of buyer power and its impact on the overall e¢ ciency of vertical relations. 7 Considering the sources of buyer power, credible threats to vertically integrate or to support market entry at the upstream level are analyzed by Katz (1987) and She¤man and Spiller (1992) . Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) focus on potential delisting strategies after downstream mergers. More closely related to our paper are those articles tackling the e¢ ciency e¤ects of buyer power. Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) point out that the formation of large buyers and thus the emergence of buyer power may increase consumer surplus as well as overall welfare since suppliers'investment incentives increase. Montez (2008) shows that an upstream …rm may choose higher capacities when buyers merge as long as the cost of capacity are su¢ ciently low. Negative welfare e¤ects due to increased buyer power are analyzed by Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) . They show that a retail merger can induce the manufacturers to reduce the variety of their products in order to comply with "average" preferences (see also Chen 2004) . Battigalli et al. (2007) …nd that buyer power weakens a supplier's incentive to invest in quality improvements. Our results point out that the e¢ ciency e¤ects of increased buyer power strongly depend on the sources of buyer power. Buyer power due to lower outside options of the suppliers leads to more e¢ cient contracts, while buyer power based on credible threats to vertically integrate or based on global sourcing strategies induces less e¢ cient contracts. 5 Ronnen (1991) shows that a minimum quality standard which has been set by the government reduces di¤erentiation among competitors and, thus, leads to more intense competition. Crampes and Hollander (1995) approve these results for variable costs of di¤erentiation. These results are, however, only robust for price competition. If …rms compete in quantities, minimum quality standards decrease overall welfare (Valletti, 2000) . Furthermore, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) show that minimum quality standards impede collusion. 6 It is, however, heavily debated whether private standards may harm suppliers, in particular smallholders in developing countries. For detailed case studies, see Balsevich et al. (2003) and Boselie et al. (2003) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we specify our model. Section 3 focuses on the downstream …rm's pricing decisions as well as the upstream …rm's incentives to invest and to truthfully announce the quality of her product. In Section 4, we analyze the bargaining process in the intermediate good market and consider the quality choice of the downstream …rm. Section 5 presents an example that illustrates our results. Finally, we conclude and discuss our …ndings.
The Model
We analyze an in…nitely repeated game where an upstream …rm U sells a product x to a downstream …rm D that distributes the product to …nal consumers. Both …rms are supposed to be risk-neutral. At the beginning of each period …rms U and D negotiate about a delivery contract that is supposed to be binding. The contract comprises a target quality for product x as well as a two-part delivery tari¤ T consisting of a wholesale price w and a …xed fee F: Focusing on quality uncertainty, we assume that the good's quality is stochastically determined in each period. The upstream …rm U; however, can increase the probability of complying with the target quality by investing some e¤ort e. We further assume that neither the realization of nor the e¤ort spent by the upstream …rm can be observed by the downstream …rm D: In order to avoid potential e¢ ciency losses due to this kind of asymmetric information, …rms have to rely on incentive compatible delivery contracts.
Demand and Quality. Good x is assumed to be an experience good. For simplicity, we assume that consumers learn the product's quality immediately after it is o¤ered and adjust their demand accordingly. Alternatively, consumers may learn the product's quality after having consumed it. Assuming that consumers buy sequentially and that they share their information, we obtain essentially the same results as long as each period is long enough.
We denote the demand for good x by X(p; ) where p indicates the price. Demand is increasing in , decreasing in p and concave in both arguments, i.e. X p < 0 < X and X pp ; X < 0. 8 In each period the product's quality is stochastically determined, where can be either high or low, i.e. 2 ; with < . The probability that good x is of quality is decreasing in , while it is increasing in the e¤ort e …rm U invests in careful production techniques, monitoring or quality assurance systems. Denoting (e; ) the probability that realizes, we have Pr = e = (e; ); Pr ( = j e) = 1 (e; )
with : (0; ) = 0 and < 0 < e ; e < 0 for all e > 0:
Additionally, we assume that e¤ort induces increasing and convex costs of c(e) per period with c 0 ; c 00 > 0. After exerting e¤ort, the upstream …rm privately learns the realization of :
Tari¤s. Using the revelation principle, we focus on delivery tari¤s which are contingent on the quality level b which the upstream …rm U announces after having observed the realized quality of the product. The delivery tari¤ T (w; F; b ) is given by
The downstream …rm cannot directly observe the actual quality of good x as she can not fully control the complete batch ex ante due to prohibitively high costs. However, the downstream …rm is able to infer the actual quality from her demand as consumers learn the quality and adjust their demand accordingly. Thus, the downstream …rm is able to detect untruthful announcements by observing her actual demand. Nevertheless she cannot verify untruthful announcements expost, as low qualities can also be caused by misconduct such as improper shipping or handling at the downstream level. While this implies that untruthful announcements cannot be punished contractually, the downstream …rm is supposed to refrain from continuing the relation with the upstream …rm U once untruthful announcements has been detected. In this case the game continues such that both …rms get their outside options.
Expected pro…ts. To simplify the analysis, we normalize production costs at the upstream level as well as distribution and transformation costs at the downstream level to zero. Employing T (w; F; b ) and assuming truthful announcement, the expected per period pro…t of the upstream 7 …rm E U is given by
with :
In turn, the downstream …rm's expected per period pro…t E D can be written as
with : This is due to our assumptions that delivery contracts are negotiated before the quality realizes and that contracts are binding. We exclude the possibility that the upstream or the downstream …rm can quit the contract after the quality has been realized. 9 In summary, we analyze an in…nitely repeated game where the following four-stage game takes place in every period: First, …rms U and D negotiate a target quality and a menu of two-part tari¤s which are contingent on the quality b the upstream …rm will announce. The upstream …rm decides how much e¤ort to spend and observes the realized quality in the second 9 We consider explicit contracts and do not anaylze the possibility that the negotiating parties can break the contractual agreement on the (contingent) delivery tari¤s. This setting is in line with the traditional literature on incentive contracts but di¤ers from relational incentive contracts in repeated games with moral hazard and adverse selection as analyzed in Levin (2003) . 8 stage. Subsequently, she decides whether or not to report the actual quality truthfully. In the last stage of the game, given the upstream …rm's announcement, the appropriate delivery tari¤s are selected. The downstream …rm chooses her prices and …nally demand as well as pro…ts realize. The interaction between …rms D and U ends if the downstream …rm detects an untruthful announcement by observing that actual demand di¤ers from expected demand.
In this case, both …rms get their outside option in all future periods. We focus on stationary contracts and solve the game by backward induction.
Prices, Announcement, and E¤ort
We begin our analysis by characterizing the optimal downstream prices for given two-part tari¤s and an announced quality b : We then solve the third stage of the game, where we determine the upstream …rm's incentives to announce the true realization of . Subsequently, we consider the e¤ort the upstream …rm spends in order to enhance the probability of achieving the target quality. Delivery tari¤s as well as target qualities negotiated by the …rms will be analyzed in the next section.
Downstream Prices. In the …nal stage of the game, the downstream …rm sets the price p for product x. This decision is based on the quality the upstream …rm has announced and the implied delivery tari¤. Though the downstream …rm can infer the actual quality from her demand ex post, we assume that she can not adjust her prices in the downstream market. 10 Accordingly, the downstream …rm's optimal prices are determined by
Let p(w; ) and p(w; ) denote the solutions of (5) for b = and b = respectively.
Announcement. After having observed the realized quality, the upstream …rm announces the quality b ; which also determines the actual delivery tari¤. Deciding whether or not to announce the realized quality truthfully, the upstream …rm trades o¤ her potential gains from deviating in the current period against the losses resulting from not trading with the downstream 1 0 Due to price announcements in lea ‡ets or advertising brochures the downstream …rm is committed to the price she has set initially. Thus, price adjustments are not possible in the short-run. …rm in all future periods. Denoting E U …rm U 's expected continuation pro…t and > 0 the discount factor, …rm U 's incentive constraints for truthful announcements can be written as
with : X := X(p; ); X := X(p; ):
The upstream …rm reports the actual quality of product x truthfully if the incentive constraints (6) and (7) are satis…ed.
E¤ort. Turning to the e¤ort chosen by the upstream …rm, we focus on the case where the incentive constraints (6) and (7) are satis…ed. 11 Employing (3), the supplier's optimal e¤ort e ( ) is implicitly given by
For later reference, note further that (8) and simple comparative statics lead to sign @e @w = sign d U dw :
Inspection of (9) shows that for given F and F as well as w su¢ ciently low, the e¤ort level chosen by the upstream …rm will increase in w, i.e. @e =@w > 0 as long as w < w k := arg max wX. In turn, the e¤ort level reacts ambiguously in the target quality level . Since we have
with e < 0, (10) implies that @e =@ is negative as long as U is su¢ ciently high.
Delivery Tari¤s and Quality
In the …rst stage of the game both …rms negotiate about a non-linear delivery tari¤ and a target quality. The …rms aim at maximizing their joint pro…t when determining the delivery tari¤.
The joint pro…t is divided such that each party gets her disagreement payo¤ plus a share of the incremental gains from trade. Formalizing this approach, we apply the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. 12 The Nash bargaining solution in each period is then given by
Wholesale prices as well as the target quality are determined in order to maximize the joint pro…t of both …rms. Incremental gains from trade are shared by the …xed fees. Additionally, (11) implies that the upstream (downstream) …rm's bargaining position is the better the higher her outside option U ( D ).
In order to analyze both the negotiated target quality and the delivery tari¤ T (w; F; b ), we …rst assume that the incentive constraints (6) and (7) are not binding. We will use this solution as a benchmark for the more complicated case where contracts have to ensure truthful announcement.
Unconstrained Bargaining
Assuming that (6) and (7) are not binding, we maximize (11) with respect to the tari¤s F ; w and (F ; w) as well as : The optimal tari¤s (w ; F ) and (w ; F ) satisfy 13
where is de…ned as pX pX. Furthermore, (12) and the envelope theorem imply d / d = pX . Hence, the …rst order condition for the optimal target quality can be written as
As expected, wholesale prices equal marginal costs implying undistorted monopoly prices in the downstream market. In turn, the …xed fees are used to divide the joint pro…t and to e¢ ciently allocate the risk of getting a low quality. Since (12) leads to D D = 0, any risk is fully borne by the upstream …rm, which also implies that the upstream …rm's decision with respect to e maximizes the expected joint pro…t of both …rms (see (8)). Using these results, the optimal target quality ; implicitly given by (13) , maximizes the overall expected pro…ts of both …rms.
Thus, we get:
Proposition 1 If the incentive constraints are not binding, the bargaining outcome is e¢ cient.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 con…rms the well-known result that non-linear tari¤s ensure an e¢ cient outcome in a bilateral bargaining framework. The negotiating …rms maximize their joint surplus by determining the delivery tari¤s in order to guarantee e¢ cient investment and pricing decisions.
However, taking imperfect information about the upstream …rm's investments and the actual quality into account, e¢ ciency can only be ensured if the upstream …rm's incentives constraints are satis…ed. Employing (12) , note …rst that (7) is satis…ed as long as (6) holds. Moreover, focusing on the stationary solution, i.e. on E U = E U and E D = E D , it is easy to show that (6) is equivalent to 14 ( 2 ) + pX c(e )
with : := U + D :
Note that (14) does not rely on U only. Given that total surplus is divided among both …rms, incentive compatibility requires that the sum of both …rms'outside options is low enough.
E¢ cient bargaining outcomes, thus, require that the total gains from trade, i.e. E U + E D ( U + D ) = + pX c(e ) ( U + D ), are high enough while the discount rate must be low enough.
Constrained Bargaining
When (14) is binding, the negotiated delivery tari¤s as well as the target quality have to be distorted in order to meet the upstream …rm's incentive constraints. More precisely, delivery tari¤s and the target quality have to induce the upstream …rm to reveal the actual quality of her product.
Analyzing the constrained bargaining problem, we get that the wholesale price w is strictly positive. Furthermore, the target quality is distorted in order to reduce e¢ ciency losses due to ine¢ cient e¤ort decisions by the upstream …rm.
Starting with (6) , F leads to truthful announcements as long as
Employing (15) 
The optimal target quality c is implicitly given by
Compared to (12) and (13), (16) and (17) show that the optimal choice of w and balances the e¢ ciency losses due to ine¢ cient wholesale prices and target qualities and their impact on the upstream …rm's investment decision. The implications for the upstream …rm's investment are captured by the second term on the RHS of (16) and (17), respectively, where e ( U )
measures the di¤erences between joint marginal pro…ts and the upstream …rm's marginal pro…ts from increasing e. Furthermore, we get that the optimal delivery contract is such that the 1 5 These results are derived in the proof of the next proposition.
13
following inequalities
hold. Combining (16)- (18) and restricting the analysis to w c < w k , we obtain:
Proposition 2 If the incentive constraint is binding, the bargaining solution is characterized by ine¢ ciently low upstream investments and w c = 0 < w c . Furthermore, for given w c and e , the optimal target quality c is ine¢ ciently low.
Under unconstrained bargaining wholesale prices as well as the target quality maximize joint surplus, while the …xed fees are used to divide the joint surplus between the …rms and to ensure e¢ cient e¤ort decisions by shifting all risk to the upstream …rm. If the upstream …rm's incentive constraint is binding, one of these instruments has to be used to ensure truthful announcement.
Hence, delivery tari¤s, the allocation of risk and, thus, the upstream …rm's e¤ort decisions become ine¢ cient. In order to alleviate the implied ine¢ ciencies and to increase the upstream …rm's e¤ort, the optimal w c as well as the optimal target quality c are distorted. While a positive w c induces higher e¤ort (see (9) ), the optimal target quality c must be distorted downwards for given w c and e (see (10) and (18)). Note that w c > 0 causes a double mark-up problem inducing further e¢ ciency losses.
Though Proposition 2 shows that both w c and c are ine¢ cient, the overall e¤ect of the incentive constraint (14) on the target quality c can be ambiguous. Restricting the analysis to linear demand X(p; ) with X pp = X p = 0 and de…ning c as the highest where the upstream …rm's incentive constraint is not binding, we obtain:
Proposition 3 Assuming linear demand and starting with = c , an increase in leads to a lower target quality, i.e. c < , as long as / is decreasing in e. With > c an increase in is the more likely to increase c the more the wholesale price w c increases in :
The …rst part of Proposition 3 con…rms Proposition 2 as close to c leads to relatively low distortions with respect to w c and e . Thus, in order to increase the upstream …rm's e¤ort, the target quality must be lower than in the case of unconstrained bargaining. A further increase in the …rms'outside options, i.e. > c ; results in higher distortions of the wholesale price and higher e¤ort spent by the upstream …rm. This allows the …rms to increase the target quality c without reducing the probability of getting c too much. In fact, the example analyzed in the next section shows that a high outside option may well lead to c > .
So far, we have limited our analysis to the case where the downstream and the upstream …rm decide jointly about the quality requirements. However, our results do not change if either the downstream …rm or the upstream …rm sets the quality requirements unilaterally. When deciding about the target quality, either …rm anticipates that delivery tari¤s are negotiated in order to maximize total industry pro…t. As this pro…t is split between the …rms according to the Nash bargaining solution, each …rm has an incentive to choose the target quality such that total industry pro…t is maximized. Hence, we have:
The choice of the target quality is the same irrespective of whether …rms negotiate the target quality or whether the target quality is chosen unilaterally by one of the …rms before negotiations about delivery tari¤ s take place.
Corollary 1 shows that our analysis can be directly applied to private standards chosen by either the downstream or the upstream …rm. In particular, private standards implemented by downstream retailers in order to ensure the quality assurance along the value chain tend to be more e¢ cient the lower the upstream …rm's outside option. Note that this may be caused by the ongoing consolidation process in the retail markets and thus the increasing retailer's gatekeeper control towards …nal consumer markets. Conversely, private standards tend to be ine¢ ciently high if upstream …rms have various alternative trading possibilities.
Example
In order to illustrate our results and to characterize the potential ine¢ ciencies due to imperfect information in more detail, we now turn to a simple example. We use a standard quasi-linear utility function and focus on the comparative statics with respect to the …rms'outside options.
Consumers'utility is given by
Di¤erentiating U (x; ) with respect to x, we obtain X(p; ) =
<
:
Furthermore, we normalize to zero and assume that the probability (e; ), the upstream …rm's costs c(e) and the discount factor are given by (e; ) = min e 1 + ; 1 ; c(e) = e 2 2 and = 0:1:
Note that (21) implies that / does not depend on e.
Calculating w and (see (12) and (13)) and analyzing the upstream …rm's incentive constraint (6), it is easy to show that there exists a critical value c 0:22 such that (6) is binding for all = U + D > c . We also …nd a value of above which total industry surplus is lower than the …rms'outside options. This corresponds to m 0:25 indicating that no trade occurs for all = U + D > m . Using (15)-(17), we obtain the graphs shown in Figure 1 . If the incentive constraint is binding, i.e. > c ; a higher unambiguously increases the optimal wholesale price w c : However, the relation between and the optimal target quality c is not monotone. Starting from = c ; an increase in …rst reduces c ; while for higher values of the target quality c is …nally increasing in . Our model also allows us to evaluate the welfare consequences of retailers'increasing buyer power (OECD 1998 , EC 1999 . Relating retailer's buyer power to her share in overall pro…ts, buyer power in our model can be either caused by a high value of the buyer's outside option or by a low value of the supplier's outside option. 16 We …nd that the welfare e¤ects of increasing buyer power crucially depend on its sources. If higher buyer power is caused by a diminished outside option of the supplier, contracts become more e¢ cient and social welfare raises. Thus, as long as downstream consolidation reduces the supplier's outside option, i.e. U , by limiting her trading alternatives, downstream consolidation and the implied increase in buyer power lead to more e¢ cient contracts. In turn, if higher buyer power is based on an improved outside option of the retailer, i.e. D , contracts become less e¢ cient and social welfare decreases. Additionally, buyer power tracing back to an improved outside option of the retailer may well lead to more stringent quality requirements as observed in the retail industry (OECD 2006 
Conclusion
We have analyzed a simple vertical structure with one upstream …rm selling a good to a downstream …rm over an in…nite number of periods. Considering a framework of hidden action and hidden information and using the Nash bargaining solution, we have shown that high gains from trade lead to e¢ cient qualities and delivery tari¤s. With high outside options of the …rms, incentive compatible contracts have to be distorted. While wholesale prices are ine¢ ciently high, the negotiated target qualities depend non-monotonically on the …rms'outside options. Ine¢ ciently high qualities can result whenever the …rms'outside options are high enough.
Applying these results to the analysis of buyer power, we …nd that large buyer power resulting from low outside options of suppliers leads to reduced wholesale and retail prices as well as to more e¢ cient qualities. Similarly, relation speci…c investments by upstream …rms can not only enhance the bargaining position of the downstream …rm, it can also increase the e¢ ciency of the …rms' interaction. Conversely, a better outside option of the retailer-for example due to global sourcing (or private label) strategies-implies less e¢ cient contracts in intermediate good markets. Thus, the impact of buyer power on the e¢ ciency of delivery contracts crucially depends on the sources of buyer power.
We have limited our analysis to the case of binding contracts where …rms are committed to adhere to the negotiated delivery tari¤s. Turning to informal or relational contracts, the upstream as well as the downstream …rm would have the possibility to renegotiate the delivery tari¤s after the product's quality has been realized. Potential renegotiation of delivery tari¤s rules out any delivery tari¤ which is ex post ine¢ cient. Correspondingly, delivery tari¤s with wholesale prices above marginal costs can not be part of a stationary equilibrium contract.
Combining these observations, we get that optimal informal or relational contracts may lead to even more distorted quality decisions. While endogenous outside options and high qualities increase the upstream …rm's incentive to deviate from the relational contract, ex post e¢ ciency of delivery tari¤s reduces the number of instruments the …rms can use to provide the upstream …rm with the right incentives to invest. These observations and our results concerning the relation between the optimal marginal delivery tari¤ and the target quality lead to the conjecture that relational contracts imply a monotone negative relation between the negotiated (target) qualities and the …rms'outside options.
Finally, our model does not reproduce quality failures and thus food scandals in equilibrium.
Although there is a positive probability that the product's quality undercuts the target quality level, product recalls never occur as the upstream …rm always informs the downstream …rm truthfully about the actual quality. However, assuming that the …rms are not fully informed about each other's outside option or the discount factor, the upstream …rm may have an incentive to deviate if her actual quality is low. In this case, false announcements by the upstream …rm and, correspondingly, product failures become possible.
…rst obtain
with D := D D . (23), (24) and @e / @F = @e / @F imply that we must have
Using (25), the …rst order conditions with respect to w and w can be written as @N @w = w @X @p @p @w = 0; @N @w = (1 )w @X @p @p @w = 0;
which leads to w = w = 0. Employing these results, we also get
where the last equality follows from using the envelope theorem with respect to p. Finally, solving for F and F , we obtain 
Turning to w, solving (34) for F c , using E D ( ) = E D and E U ( ) = E U as well as (8), the …rst order condition for w c can be written as @N @w = e @e @w U + d dw pX = 0;
where U is given by (recall := U D )
To prove the proposition, note …rst that d/ dw pX = 0 for w = 0 and d/ dw pX < 0 for all w > 0. Furthermore, using (9), we obtain sign @e @w = sign d dw h w(X b X)
i > 0 as long as w < w k :
Considering the sign of U and assuming U 0, (36) and (38) imply w = 0.
Additionally, we get U 0 , ( 2 ) + pX c(e ) for w = 0;
which contradicts the assumption that (14) is binding. Hence we must have U > 0 and therefore ine¢ cient risk sharing as well as w c > 0.
Turning to and using the envelope theorem with respect to e , the optimal target quality c is implicitly given by To determine the sign of the RHS of (41), note …rst that (40) leads to
Substituting @e / @ and solving (42) for ; we get Furthermore, di¤erentiating @e / @ partially with respect to e , we get @ @ e @e @ = U > 0:
Finally, evaluating @e / @ at the critical level , we have @e @ e = = d / d e ( U ) < 0:
Turning back to (41), we thus have + d / d > 0; which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the …rst part of the proposition, note …rst that = c implies w c = 0 and that (17) reduces to (13) . Furthermore, we have @ 2 N @ @ = e 2 @e @ < 0 < e 2 @e @w = @ 2 N @w@ ;
where the …rst inequality in (46) follows from the continuity of @e / @ and (43)-(45). Using (46) and linear demand, simple but tedious calculations yield sign @ c @ = c = sign @ 2 N @w@ @ 2 N @w@ @ 2 N @ @ @ 2 N @w 2 = c (47) = sign " 2 e pX @e @w 2 + @e @ 2 @e @w
Substituting @e / @ and @e / @w into (48) and evaluating at = c ; we obtain e + e 0 ) sign @ c @ = c < 0;
which together with + = 0 leads to c < for > c but small enough. To prove the second part, assume that the incentive constraint (14) is binding. Then we must have 
applying the implicit function theorem, di¤erentiating (51) totally with respect to , substituting the equilibrium values of @e / @w and @e / @ (see (40) and (36)), we obtain d c d = 1 e d pX dp
with : e := @ @ + @ @e @e @ ;
where we have again used X pp = X p = 0. Since d pX dp < 0 < + d / d , (52) shows that c is more likely to increase in the higher dw c / d .
